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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to study how manufacturing plants in India adjusted to trade 
liberalization during the period 1998–99 to 2007–08. We estimate how the labor share 
changed due to tariff reduction. Our results indicate that a decline in output tariffs led to an 
increase in the labor share of income. In contrast, a fall in input tariffs led to a decrease in 
the labor share. Controlling for factor intensity, we find that in technology intensive and 
human capital resource intensive sectors, both a decline in input and output tariff rates led to 
a decline in labor share. A fall in tariffs only led to an increase in labor share for labor 
intensive and low-technology plants. Hence, India’s bias towards capital and technology 
intensive production explains the overall decline in labor share in the post reform period. 
Furthermore, the empirical results show that labor adjustment occurred more efficiently in 
Indian states with flexible labor laws. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of the opening of trade on labor market outcomes has been a contested 
issue for many decades. The question has recently attracted additional interest,  
as governments in developed countries, such as in the United Kingdom and the  
United States, announced protectionist measures to shield domestic workers from 
foreign competition. Most scientific work has focused on labor market outcomes in 
developed countries, 1  especially the United States (e.g., Autor and Dorn 2013). 
Recently, more and more evidence has emerged of how labor markets in developing 
countries have adjusted to trade opening (e.g., McCaig and Pavcnik 2015). This paper 
aims to contribute to this literature.  
Trade opening typically implies a change of market access and prices. We know from 
economic theory that a change in market access triggers a reallocation of resources 
within an economy. While some sectors expand, others contract. The so-called “new 
new” trade theory shows that, within sectors, the most productive firms are able to 
benefit from trade opening, while the least productive firms exit. Trade theory thus 
predicts an adjustment of the economy due to changes in factor prices; however, this 
theory is somewhat mute with regard to the process of adjustment itself. It is typically 
assumed that the economy fully uses its resources (including full employment) prior to, 
and after trade opening.  
In this paper we study empirically how manufacturing plants in India have adjusted their 
labor shares due to trade opening during the period 1998 to 2008. We add to the 
current literature by studying how the adjustment differs across sectors. Our paper 
significantly extends upon the work of Ahsan and Mitra (2014) by adding input tariffs 
and controlling for different levels of technology and factor intensity across firms.  
We find that a decline in output tariffs was associated with an increase in the labor 
share. In contrast, a fall in input tariffs led to a decrease in the labor share. This general 
result becomes more nuanced once we take into account the factor intensity of sectors. 
We find that, in technology intensive and human capital resource intensive sectors, 
both a decline in input and output tariff rates led to a decline in labor share. When 
dividing the sample into the Indian states with flexible and inflexible labor laws, our 
results suggests that Indian plants subject to inflexible labor laws adjusted to trade 
opening by systematically replacing labor with capital.  
2. BACKGROUND 
Until the reforms of 1991, India pursued a protectionist regime that insulated the 
domestic industry from the rigors of market competition. The idea was that imports 
should be avoided in order to promote domestic production and development. The 
public sector was given a central role in the running of the economy. However, in 
contrast to the economic objective of rapid industrialization with equitable growth, this 
policy regime created an economy of complacent rentiers rather than competitive 
entrepreneurs and stifled the growth of the industrial sector. In addition, government 
expenditures spiraled and made the Indian economy vulnerable to external shocks.  
  
                                                
1  See Görg (2011) for an excellent review on evidence in developed countries. 
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In 1991, external economic shocks hit the Indian economy, and the Indian government 
approached the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for support. The two 
international organizations made their assistance conditional on the implementation of 
profound structural reforms. This created a milieu for the political will to undertake 
large-scale economic reforms, which had already been discussed in economic circles 
in India in the 1980s. Starting in 1991, the Indian government started a comprehensive 
liberalization strategy that gradually dismantled the protective shield for domestic 
producers. One important pillar of the new strategy was the opening-up of India’s highly 
protected trade regime. The government first started by opening its market for raw 
materials, intermediate goods and capital goods. The market for consumer goods 
remained highly protected throughout the 1990s.  
Figure 1 illustrates how the average and weighted tariff rate for industrial products were 
drastically reduced from 81.9% and 49.5% in 1990 to 57.4% and 27.8% in 1992. The 
process of tariff rationalization continued over the next two decades. By the end of the 
1990s, in 1999, the average and weighted tariff rates stood at 33% and 28.61% and 
the peak tariff was reduced to 35%. The Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) was 
reduced from 125.9% in 1986–1990 to 80.2% in 1990–95 and to 40.4% in 1996–2000 
(Das 2003). 
Figure 1: Average Tariff for Industrial Products (1990–2008) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2012) p. 8. 
While in the 1990s, during the first decade of reforms, tariff rates declined substantially, 
some experts argued that the level was still sufficiently high to substantially discourage 
imports (Goldar 2012). Furthermore, imports of most products were still subject to a 
range of non-tariff measures. Das (2003) estimated the nominal and effective rates  
of protection and found that they remained high until the year 2000, reaching almost 
100 per cent for intermediate and final goods.  
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It was only in 2000, after India lost a WTO dispute against the United States on 
quantitative restrictions (QR), when the Indian government decided to remove a large 
number of non-tariff restrictions (UNCTAD 2011). In the 2000s, the long-protected 
consumer sector was opened to trade, which led to a sharp rise in India’s imports of 
final goods, leading, in turn, to a significant increase in competition for domestic 
producers. At the same time, the fall in the price of intermediate inputs allowed Indian 
manufacturers to boost their productivity. Consequently, the manufacturing sector grew 
by 8.5% annually during the 2000s, compared to 7.5% in the preceding decade. 
Figure 2 shows the fall in tariffs for the ten most important industries in India. The 
decline was most dramatic in the apparel sector, which employed roughly one quarter 
of the workers in the manufacturing sector.  
Figure 2: Tariff Rates by Industry 2000 and 2008 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2012) p. 10. 
Overall, the 2000s can be described as the period in which Indian consumers and firms 
started to be exposed to the benefits and challenges of world markets. Figure 3 depicts 
the evolution of India’s imports and exports from 1990 to 2013. As we can see, India’s 
trade with the rest of the world started to surge in the early 2000s. In our study  
we cover this decisive period (years 1998 to 2008) of India’s integration into the  
world economy.  
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Figure 3: India’s Import and Export in Current US Dollars  
(billion) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on trade data downloaded from WITS. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
India’s experience with trade opening has attracted scholarly attention for many years. 
Development economists have attempted to evaluate the impact of trade opening of 
various dimensions of the Indian economy.  
With respect to the impact on poverty, the evidence remains mixed. Using four rounds 
of Household survey data (1983–84, 1987–88, 1993–94, and 1999–2000) Topalova 
(2007) finds that districts that were more exposed to tariff reductions experienced a 
lower reduction in rural poverty. Contrary to her study, Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2007), 
using household survey data, undertake a state-level analysis and find no evidence for 
worsened poverty due to the reductions in trade protection. Instead, they find that 
states whose workers were on average more exposed to foreign competition had lower 
rural, urban and overall poverty rates.  
Another dimension covered was the impact on inequality. Using Indian household 
expenditure survey data from 1988–2005, Krishna and Sethupathy (2011) find that 
income inequality fell between 1988 and 1994, rose between 1994 and 2000, and fell 
again after 2000. They find that the changes to the state-level measures for trade 
protection had no significant impact on changes in inequality across households within 
states. This is in line with the findings of Topalova (2007), who also finds no discernible 
effect of trade reforms on rural and urban inequality in India.  
More closely related to our study are the empirical papers that evaluate the impact on 
firms. One strand of literature looks at the link between trade and firm productivity. 
Sivadasan (2009) analyzes the impact of tariff reduction and FDI reforms on  
cross-sectional data of manufacturing plants during the period 1986–87 to 1994–95. 
The study finds a positive impact of FDI and tariff reforms on plant level productivities 
for 1995–95, as compared to 1987–90. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) use firm level 
data for the period 1989–2001 and analyze the impact of the reduction in output and 
input tariffs on firm level productivity growth. The study finds the reduction in both tariffs 
to have had a significant impact on firm level productivity growth, and gains are found 
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to be larger with respect to the fall in input tariffs. Gupta (2016) uses plant level data of 
Indian manufacturing for the period 1998–88 to 2007–08 and analyzes the channels 
through which trade can drive productivity growth. Her study finds that technology 
spillovers, in addition to input and output variety growth, significantly contributed to 
higher plant level productivity in the case of India. In contrast to the above, the studies 
by Balakrishnan et al. (2000) and Bollard et al. (2013) find no significant role for trade 
reforms in the generating of productivity gains in Indian manufacturing. 
Our study builds on previous attempts to gauge the impact of trade opening on 
employment and labor shares. Hasan et al. (2012) find urban unemployment to have 
declined after trade opening in states with more flexible labor markets and larger 
employment shares in net exporting industries. Workers in industries experiencing 
greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to become unemployed, 
especially in net export industries. Using aggregate industry level data, Hansan et al. 
(2012) evidence that trade liberalization had a positive impact on labor demand 
elasticity. They also show that trade reforms led to a reduction in labor share due to a 
decline in the bargaining power of workers. However, using micro-level data, Ahsan 
and Mitra (2014) uncover variation in terms of the impact of trade liberalization on labor 
shares. For small and labor-intensive firms, the trade reforms seemingly led to an 
increase in labor shares, while the impact was found to be the opposite for the larger 
and less labor-intensive firms. Mishra and Utsav (2005) use household survey data  
and find that, over time, a negative relationship forms between changes in trade policy 
and changes in industry wage premiums. Since tariff reductions were proportionately 
larger in sectors that employ a larger share of unskilled workers, their findings imply 
that unskilled workers experienced an increase in their relative incomes due to the  
trade reforms. 
Traditional trade theory (the Heckscher-Ohlin model) predicts that gains from trade 
favor abundant factors. In the case of a developing country with abundant low-skilled 
labor, like India, this would imply that unskilled labor would benefit the most from 
globalization. However, new theories, such as Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004) 
suggest that, even in a labor-abundant country, trade liberalization can reduce the 
wages of unskilled labor, thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Moreover, such adjustments may be costly, with the burden falling disproportionately 
on the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 2004). 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES  
4.1 Plant Level Data  
The data for this study come from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). We use 
the plant level panel data of the ASI covering the period between 1998–99 to 2007–08. 
The ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics in India.2 The ASI extends to the 
entire country, except the States of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram and the Union 
territory of Lakshadweep. It covers all factories that are registered under the sections 
2(m) (i) and 2(m) (ii) of the Factories Act of 1948. This implies that all factories 
employing 10 or more workers using power, and those employing 20 or more workers 
                                                
2  Many studies in the Indian context have earlier used industry level and plant-level cross sections from 
the ASI (Hasan et al. 2007; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Sivadasan 2009; Harrison et al. 2012; Bollard et al. 
2013), however, the earlier data of the ASI did not disclose plant identifiers. This study uses the recently 
released data with plant identifiers launched by the ASI, which enables us to create a panel of 
manufacturing plants in India.  
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without using power are surveyed under the ASI. The primary unit of enumeration is a 
plant/factory in the case of the manufacturing industry.  
The ASI data is collected annually by the Field Operations Division of the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in consultation with the Chief Inspector of 
Factories in the States. Under the ASI framework, factories are classified into two 
sectors, namely the ‘Census’ sector and the ‘Sample’ sector. In the census sector, the 
data from all the factories employing 100 or more workers is collected on a complete 
enumeration basis. The remaining factories fall under the sample sector, for which data 
is collected by drawing a representative sample using sampling techniques. since 
continuous data is only available for this set, this study covers only those plants that fall 
under the census sector of ASI and can be successfully analyzed in a panel form. The 
data is an unbalanced panel and contains detailed information on production related 
factors like output, fixed assets, inventories, working capital, inputs, employment, labor 
costs, raw materials, electricity, power and fuel consumption, location, ownership, year 
of incorporation, etc.  
As per the National Industrial Classification (NIC), factories are classified into industry 
categories up to the 4-digit level of disaggregation in ASI.3 In this study, we only focus 
on those plants which operate in the manufacturing sector; that is, which belong to the 
NIC15 to NIC36 two-digit industry groups. Labor share in this study is defined as the 
share of total wages in the net total sales revenue of a plant (See Tables 1 and 2 for 
summary statistics). 
Table 1: Average Labor Share of Income for the Period 1999–2008 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
1999 0.126 0.130 
2000 0.132 0.135 
2001 0.124 0.131 
2002 0.124 0.130 
2003 0.124 0.129 
2004 0.119 0.123 
2005 0.108 0.113 
2006 0.106 0.111 
2007 0.100 0.106 
2008 0.100 0.104 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Age (years) 22.02 22.06 
No of Workers 313.93 851.17 
Capital stock (In Rs million) 544.14 4,172.80 
Output (In Rs million) 1,146.53 9,619.45 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
                                                
3  NIC classification of Indian industries closely corresponds to the ISIC classification  
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4.2 Tariff Data 
Output tariffs: To measure the trade openness of a given industry, we use the most 
disaggregate level of output tariff data possible. In our study, this corresponds to the 
four-digit level data as per ISIC Rev 3. Since the ASI categorizes factories in this panel 
data per the NIC 1998 classification, we construct a concordance table between  
four-digit ISIC rev 3 and 4 digit NIC 1998 in order to match the tariff data with the ASI 
panel. The primary data series of tariffs was obtained from the TRAINS database of 
UNCTAD. However, tariff data was not available in TRAIN for some of the years, for 
which instances we used data obtained from the IDB database of the WTO.  
Input tariffs: In addition to output tariffs, which measure competition faced by domestic 
producers from the import of final goods, trade liberalization also facilitates access to 
cheaper and advanced intermediate inputs. To capture the impact of improved access 
to advanced intermediate input, we construct a measure of input tariffs following 
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). It is defined as follows: 
𝐼𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡=Σj⍺𝑖𝑗 𝑂𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑡  (1) 
For example, if we assume that the shoe manufacturing industry (i) uses two 
intermediates (j) (namely, leather and rubber with tariffs of 10 and 20 percent, 
respectively) and value shares of 0.8 and 0.2, respectively, then, using the above 
formula, the input tariff faced by the shoe industry stands at 12%. The input  
shares, ⍺𝑖𝑗’s is the share of input j in the total input cost of industry i. We estimate the 
input-shares in this study by using the Input-Output Table (2003–04) for India obtained 
from the Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
Effective rate of protection: We use an alternate variable to measure protection, 
namely, the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP). Instead of using input and output tariffs 
separately, we construct a single variable to measure overall protection faced by the 
industry; since nominal tariff rates on final goods or output tariffs do not take into 
account the fact that the degree of protection conferred on an industry also depends  
on the tariff rates levied on intermediate inputs used in production, in addition to those 
levied on final goods. The use of ERP addresses this issue as it measures the 
percentage excess of domestic value added that is made possible by the tariff 
structure, as relative to the situation in the absence of tariffs on final and intermediate 
goods. Following Cordon (1966) we define ERPit as follows: 
𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (𝑂𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−𝐼𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) / (1−Σ⍺𝑖𝑗𝑗) (2) 
Here i is the industry and t is the time and ⍺𝑖𝑗 is the input share. Table 3 displays the 
average output tariffs, input tariffs and ERP for the manufacturing sector in India during 
the period 1997 to 2008. 
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Table 3: Average Tariff for Manufacturing Industry Groups Analyzed in the Study 
(1997–2008) 
Year Average Output Tariff Average Input Tariff Average ERP 
1997 32.58 14.97 35.55 
1998 33.86 15.83 36.10 
1999 35.02 16.47 36.62 
2000 34.90 16.60 36.27 
2001 33.84 16.14 34.98 
2002 30.94 14.81 31.49 
2003 30.76 14.71 31.39 
2004 30.87 14.73 31.61 
2005 20.50 8.83 22.90 
2006 17.96 16.51 20.38 
2007 18.52 7.75 21.15 
2008 14.90 5.78 18.62 
Source: Authors’ estimates using TRAINS and IDB databases accessed through the WITS software of the World Bank. 
4.3 Controls 
Mandays lost: We suspect that the conditions of labor market regulations may affect 
labor share adjustment due to trade liberalization. Different states in India have 
different levels of labor market flexibility due to the fact that industrial relations fall 
under the concurrent subject in the Indian constitution. This allows State governments 
to make their own amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which is the key 
regulation that governs industrial relations in India. As a result, labor markets have 
evolved differently across the various states in India (Besley and Burgess, 2004). To 
measure state level labor market frictions (condition), we estimate an index named 
mandays lost in strikes and lockouts per industrial worker, which is the ratio of the  
total number of mandays lost in strikes and lockouts to the total number of industrial 
workers in the state. Data on mandays lost has been obtained from the Labour Bureau, 
Government of India, while data on the state-wise number of industrial workers 
employed has been obtained from the aggregate ASI data. 
Factor intensity dummies: Labor share adjustment may vary across industries 
depending on the factor-intensity of their production. To analyze this, we use the 
Hinloopen and Marrewijk (2008) classification to group industries on the basis of  
their factor intensities. Hinloopen and Marrewijk’s (2008) classification corresponds to 
3-digit SITC level, with 240 items classified into five categories, namely (number of 
items in each category in parentheses): primary (83), natural-resource intensive (21), 
unskilled-labor intensive (26), human capital-intensive (43), technology-intensive (62), 
and unclassified (5). To match this classification with our panel data, we construct a 
concordance table between SITC 3 digit and NIC 3 digit to segregate plants based on 
the factor intensities of their production. 
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Technology intensity dummies: In addition to factor intensity-based classification,  
we also use the OECD’s ISIC REV. 3 based technology intensity classification  
of industries. This classification primarily corresponds to 2-digit level and classifies 
manufacturing industries into four sub-groups: high-technology, medium-high-
technology, medium-low-technology and low-technology groups.4 
5. ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
We start with a CES production function of the following form: 
𝑌𝑖 = [𝛼(𝐴𝑖𝐾𝑖)𝜃 +  (1 − 𝛼)(𝐵𝑖𝐿𝑖)𝜃]1/𝜃 (3) 
Assuming that labor is paid its marginal product, and following Bentotial and Saint-Paul 
(2003), we get that: 
𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 1 −  𝛼(𝐴𝑖𝑘𝑖)𝜃   (4) 
By log-linearizing equation (4) and adding in additional variables that can drive the 
labor share of income, we derive the following empirical estimation model: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (5) 
Where 𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the labor share of plant i in industry j at time t. 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the plant 
productivity, 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the plant capital output ratio, and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  are other plant specific 
controls, such as age, mandays lost in strikes and locks ins, state where the plant  
is located, etc. Tjt are industry level trade openness related variables, Pi and Yt are  
plant and year dummies. Labor share (LS) in this study is defined as the share of 
wages in the net sales revenue of the plant. Plant age has been calculated based  
on the year of establishment of the plant as reported by the plant managers.  
Plant capital has been estimated using the perpetual inventory method following 
Balakrishnan et al. (2000). Plant productivity has been estimated following Levinshon 
and Petrin’s (2004) technique.  
6. RESULTS 
The regression results of estimating equation (5) are displayed in Tables 4–9. We 
begin with reporting the baseline results in Table 4. Columns (1)–(3) are plant fixed 
effects models. We find a differential impact of input and output tariffs on labor’s share 
of income. The coefficient of out_tariff is found to be negative and highly significant 
across all specifications, indicating that a decline in output tariffs led to a rise in  
the labor’s share of the total revenue income. This result suggests that increased 
foreign competition triggered firms to hire additional workers. This result hints towards 
a HO finding in which India expands the use of its relatively abundant endowment, 
namely labor.  
  
                                                
4  Since Manufacturing n.e.c industry at 2-digit level has been allocated to more than one category we 
leave it as ‘unclassified’ for our analysis. 
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Table 4: Trade Liberalization and Labor Share  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS 
out_tariff  –0.0179** –0.0208** 
 
–0.0193** 
 
(0.00815) (0.00808) 
 
(0.00869) 
in_tariff  0.0261*** 0.0144** 
 
0.0128 
 
(0.00672) (0.00675) 
 
(0.00879) 
lnk_int 
 
–0.0250*** –0.0274*** –0.0593*** 
  
(0.00705) (0.00716) (0.00613) 
lnp 
 
–0.131*** –0.130*** –0.136*** 
  
(0.00740) (0.00747) (0.00620) 
lnage 
 
0.0825*** 0.0792*** 0.144*** 
  
(0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0184) 
lnmlpw 
 
0.0142*** 0.0180*** 0.00417 
  
(0.00498) (0.00517) (0.00558) 
lnerp 
  
–0.0151*** 
 
   
(0.00559) 
 L..ln_LS 
   
0.424*** 
    
(0.0156) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 67,275 67,275 67,275 33,806 
R-squared 0.007 0.068 0.066 
 Number of fac_no 13,353 13,353 13,353 8,482 
Note: Dependent variable is plant’s labor share. out_tariff – one year lagged output tariff, in_tariff – one year lagged 
input tariff, lnk_int – plant’s capital intensity, lnp – plant productivity, lnage – plant age, lnmlpw – mandays lost in strikes 
and lockouts, lnerp – effective rate of protection. All values are in natural log. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. 
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and constant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The coefficient of in_tariff, on the other, hand is positive and highly significant, which 
implies that a fall in input tariffs led to a decline in the labor’s share. One explanation 
could be that, now, firms have better access to inputs, including machinery, and hence 
use those more intensively at the expense of labor.  
The coefficients of lnk_int and lnp are both negative, as expected, and highly 
significant, at 1% level. This result indicates that a rise in capital input and a rise in 
productivity both lead to a decline in the labor’s share of income. The coefficient of 
lnage is positive and highly significant, suggesting that the labor’s share of the income 
is larger for older firms. This might be explained by the fact that older firms started their 
operations with relatively larger labor shares. 
The coefficient of lnmlpw is positive and highly significant. In the case of India, this 
variable is closely associated with union strength; hence, a positive coefficient lnmlpw 
is indicative of a positive impact of union strength and, hence, a higher labor share of 
income. From the estimation results of column (2), we can say that a 10% decline in 
output tariffs led to a 0.21% rise in labor’s share of income. On the other hand, a 10% 
decline in input tariffs led to a 0.14% decline in the labor’s share of income for large 
manufacturing plants in India. 
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In column (3), instead of two tariff variables, we use a composite index of the two  
(i.e. the effective rate of protection) to measure the impact of overall protection on  
labor share. The sign of lnerp is negative and significant indicating that overall, in the 
case of the Indian manufacturing industry, a decline in trade protection (measured  
by reduced tariff rates) led to a rise in the labor share of income. In columns (4) and (5) 
we estimate the same model using alternative estimation methods. Columns (4) 
corresponds to dynamic panel which has been estimated using system GMM, following 
the Arellano Bond technique. The signs of all the coefficients remain the same as those 
in the fixed effects model. The coefficient of the lagged labor share is positive, as 
expected, and highly significant, at 1% level. 
In Table 5, we analyze the differential impact of tariff reduction based on the  
factor intensity of production. The factor intensity of production based classification 
segregates industries at the 3-digit level into 5 sub-groups; however, in our regression 
model, we use four dummies: natural resource intensive (FI_nat), labor intensive 
(FI_lab), technology intensive (FI_tech), and human capital resource intensive (FI_hri). 
Using the four dummies and interactions with tariff rates, we find that the different  
sub-groups adjust the labor share of income in very different ways. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient of FI_lab dummy has a positive and significant sign, as 
expected. While, although positive in most cases, the coefficient of FI_tech and FI_hri 
dummies are insignificant. It is interesting to note that in column (2) of Table 5, as we 
interact out_tariff and in_tariff with the FI_lab dummy, the coefficients of both the 
interaction terms are negative and significant. This indicates that a decline in both kinds 
of tariffs led to an increase in the labor share of income in the labor intensive sector. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 display the interaction of out_tariff and in_tariff with  
the FI_tech and FI_hri dummies, respectively. Unlike the labor-intensive sector, the 
interactions are positive and significant, indicating that a decline in both input and 
output tariff rates led to a decline in the labor share in the technology intensive and 
human capital resource intensive sectors.  
In Table 6, we use another classification of industries to separate the plants based  
on their technology intensity. This corresponds to the OCED 2-digit technology  
intensity classification, which is comprised of the subgroups: low technology industries, 
medium-low technology industries, medium-high technology industries, high technology 
industries and un-classified. The literature suggests that the labor share should be 
affected negatively in the medium technology intensive industries, where labor has  
an easy and high substitutability with capital. In column (1) we interact the tech_low 
dummy with the corresponding output and input tariffs. The interaction term with the 
output tariff is negative and significant, suggesting that, as output tariffs fall, the labor 
share rises in low tech industries. The interaction term with the input tariffs is positive 
but insignificant. In column (2) we interact the tech_midlow dummy with output  
and input tariffs. Similar to low-tech industry, the interaction term with output tariffs  
is negative and significant. Also, the interaction with input tariffs is negative and 
significant, indicating that a decline in input tariffs leads to a rise in the labor share in 
mid-low tech industries. In column (3) we interact the tech_midhigh dummy with output 
and input tariffs. It is interesting to note that both coefficients are positive and 
significant, indicating that the labor share falls as technology intensity rises. As we 
move to column (4) which corresponds to the most advanced technology industries, 
both the interactions remain positive with higher levels of significance. Overall, these 
results suggest that as industries become more technology intensive, tariff liberalization 
leads to a decline in the labor share of income. 
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Table 5: Trade Liberalization, Labor Share and Factor Intensity of Production 
(Plant Fixed Effects Model) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS 
out_tariff  –0.0318*** –0.0123 –0.0279*** –0.0350*** 
 
(0.00832) (0.00859) (0.00841) (0.00882) 
in_tariff  0.0143** 0.0284*** 0.0136** 0.0162** 
 
(0.00674) (0.00692) (0.00681) (0.00675) 
lnp –0.109*** –0.109*** –0.109*** –0.110*** 
 
(0.00307) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) 
lnage 0.0900*** 0.0830*** 0.0850*** 0.0846*** 
 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
lnmlpw 0.0141*** 0.0116** 0.0139*** 0.0137*** 
 
(0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00497) (0.00498) 
FI_nat –0.317*** 0.147 0.155 0.135 
 
(0.110) (0.0977) (0.0967) (0.0962) 
FI_lab 0.0382 0.649*** 0.0607 0.0363 
 
(0.0971) (0.112) (0.0978) (0.0973) 
FI_tech 0.0182 0.0251 –0.0712 0.0148 
 
(0.0912) (0.0930) (0.0982) (0.0915) 
FI_hri 0.0708 0.0701 0.0838 –0.0714 
 
(0.0932) (0.0950) (0.0940) (0.103) 
out_tariff * FI_nat 0.0967*** 
   
 
(0.0166) 
   in_tariff * FI_nat 0.0773*** 
   
 
(0.0123) 
   out_tariff * FI_lab 
 
–0.136*** 
  
  
(0.0154) 
  in_tariff * FI_lab 
 
–0.0772*** 
  
  
(0.00877) 
  out_tariff * FI_tech 
  
0.0173 
 
   
(0.0131) 
 in_tariff * FI_tech 
  
0.0210** 
 
   
(0.00824) 
 out_tariff * FI_hci 
   
0.0265** 
    
(0.0129) 
in_tariff * FI_hci 
   
0.0209** 
    
(0.00925) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 67,275 67,275 67,275 67,275 
R-squared 0.070 0.074 0.068 0.068 
Number of fac_no 13,353 13,353 13,353 13,353 
Dependent variable is plant’s labor share in all regressions. out_tariff – one year lagged output tariff, in_tariff – one year 
lagged input tariff, lnp – plant productivity, lnage – plant age, lnmlpw – mandays lost in strikes and lockouts, FI_nat  
– natural resource intensive industry dummy, FI_lab – labor intensive industry dummy, FI_tech – technology intensive 
industry dummy, FI_hci – human capital intensive dummy. All values are in natural log. Clustered standard errors in 
parenthesis. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and constant *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Trade Liberalization, Labor Share and Technology Intensity  
of Production (Plant Fixed Effects Model) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS ln_LS 
out_tariff  –0.0193** 0.0157 –0.0433*** –0.0373*** 
 
(0.00802) (0.0106) (0.00885) (0.00819) 
in_tariff  0.0192*** 0.0585*** 0.0203*** 0.00615 
  (0.00672) (0.00854) (0.00681) (0.00675) 
lnp –0.117*** –0.116*** –0.117*** –0.117*** 
  (0.00320) (0.00319) (0.00320) (0.00319) 
lnage 0.0863*** 0.0882*** 0.0888*** 0.0811*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
lnmlpw 0.0140*** 0.0124** 0.0137*** 0.0135*** 
  (0.00497) (0.00495) (0.00497) (0.00495) 
tech_ low 0.112 –0.137** –0.0891 –0.0943 
  (0.159) (0.0660) (0.0657) (0.0659) 
tech_ midlow 0.0298 0.510*** 0.0462 0.0304 
  (0.0769) (0.0872) (0.0761) (0.0767) 
tech_ midhigh 0.108* 0.0796 –0.147** 0.111* 
  (0.0582) (0.0580) (0.0680) (0.0581) 
tech_high –0.261*** –0.291*** –0.251*** –0.766*** 
  (0.0555) (0.0557) (0.0551) (0.0724) 
out_tariff * tech_low –0.0793* 
     (0.0444) 
   in_tariff * tech_low 0.0173 
     (0.0249) 
   out_tariff * tech_midlow 
 
–0.110*** 
    
 
(0.0129) 
  in_tariff * tech_midlow 
 
–0.0615*** 
    
 
(0.00790) 
  out_tariff * tech_ midhigh 
  
0.0742*** 
   
  
(0.0119) 
 in_tariff * tech_midhigh 
  
0.0138* 
   
  
(0.00805) 
 out_tariff * tech_high 
   
0.121*** 
  
   
(0.0152) 
in_tariff * tech_high 
   
0.0538*** 
    
(0.00922) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 67,275 67,275 67,275 67,275 
R-squared 0.072 0.078 0.074 0.077 
Number of fac_no 13,353 13,353 13,353 13,353 
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In the case of India, labor laws fall under the concurrent list and are hence controlled 
both by the center and the state. As a result, Indian states vary significantly from each 
other in terms of the conditions of their labor laws, which makes some states more 
flexible (employer friendly) than others. To analyze whether state level differences in 
labor market flexibility affect the labor share of income, we ran separate regressions for 
plants located in states with flexible labor laws (Column 1, Table 7) and plants located 
in states with inflexible labor laws (Column 2, Table 7). In the case of states with 
flexible labor laws, the sign and significance of out_tariff remains similar to the baseline 
results; in_tariff is, however, insignificant. While in the case of states with inflexible 
labor laws, it is interesting to note that both the coefficients are positive and significant, 
indicating that a decline in both the tariff rates led to a decline in the labor share of 
income. This reflects plant-level decisions in favor of less labor-augmenting methods  
of production.  
Table 7: Trade Liberalization, Labor Share and Labor Market Flexibility 
  Flexible States Inflexible States 
Variables (1) (2) 
out_tariff  –0.0648*** 0.0229** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0108) 
in_tariff  –0.0134 0.0395*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.00916) 
lnk_int –0.0191 –0.0312*** 
 
(0.0127) (0.00903) 
lnp –0.124*** –0.127*** 
  (0.0134) (0.00932) 
lnage 0.0707*** 0.0586*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0195) 
lnmlpw 0.0206** –0.000558 
 
(0.00933) (0.00680) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 23,078 36,168 
R-squared 0.065 0.069 
Number of fac_no 4,570 7,143 
Note: Dependent variable is plant’s labor share in all regressions. out_tariff – one year lagged output tariff, in_tariff  
– one year lagged input tariff, lnk_int – plant’s capital intensity, lnp – plant productivity, lnage – plant age, lnmlpw  
– mandays lost in strikes and lockouts. All values are in natural log. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and constant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
To analyze whether industries with different factor intensities and technology intensities 
adjusted their labor share differently based on their location in flexible or inflexible 
states, we extend our sub-group analysis in Tables 8 and 9. In Table 8, we run 
separate regressions for flexible and inflexible states and analyze the interactive effect 
of tariffs with factor intensity dummies. Qualitatively, the coefficient of interaction terms 
remains the same. The labor share improved only for labor intensive industries. For the 
others, the interactions are positive and mostly significant, indicating that labor share 
declined. In Table 9 of our sub-group analysis, we analyze the interactive effect of 
tariffs with technology intensity industries. Similar to the previous case, we find that  
the results remain qualitatively similar. The labor share increased for low and mid-low 
technology industries, but declined for mid-high and high technology groups. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
This paper analyzes the impact of trade liberalization, which has been measured in the 
form of tariff reductions on the labor share in the Indian manufacturing sector. Using 
plant-level panel data for the period 1998–99 to 2007–08, overall, we find that a fall in 
output tariffs led to a rise in the labor share, while a fall in input tariffs led to a decline  
in the labor share. However, segregating industries based on factor intensity and 
technology intensity classifications yields a different picture. We find that the overall 
decline in both input and output tariffs led to a decline in the labor share in technology 
intensive and human capital resource intensive sectors. On the other hand, a fall  
in input and output tariffs led to a rise in the labor share for labor intensive and  
low-technology plants. 
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